Abstract: The 1999 Seattle protests, which brought thirty thousand people to the streets in opposition to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and set off a series of other protests against the multilateral economic institutions, helped spark significant academic interest in global civil society and its potential to act as a transformative force in global economic governance. In this article, however, I argue that many of the civil society actors that have sought to engage with and influence the WTO have been transformed in the process. They have both become more technocratic and increasingly moved toward advocating positions that accord with the neoliberal trade paradigm. I draw on Bourdieu's field theory to explain why and how this transformation has occurred. I argue that, in order to understand these changes among parts of civil society, we need to see multilateral trade governance as a social field, which civil society actors enter into as they seek to impact outcomes at the WTO. The case of the WTO challenges existing theories that conceive of global civil society as an exogenous force that acts upon the institutions of global governance, showing instead that global civil society is not in fact independent or autonomous but shaped and influenced by the institution it targets.
Introduction
In 1999, thirty thousand protestors took to the streets of Seattle in opposition to a meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) intended to launch a new round of trade negotiations.
The WTO had come into force only four years before -as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) -but it had already generated an intense reaction from civil society. As part of the global neoliberal turn, the creation of the WTO involved a significant expansion in supra-national authority and the scope of trade rules. Civil society actors viewed the WTO as exclusionary and undemocratic and were concerned about the implications of its rules for a wide range of issues including development, inequality, the environment, labor and health. Organized by a diverse network of social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and trade unions, the Seattle protests closed the city's downtown core for four days and disrupted the meetings of negotiators. The "Battle of Seattle," as it came to be known, served as a coming out party for the anti-globalization, or global justice, movement and set off a wave of protests at meetings of other international economic organizations -including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the G8/G20 -around the world.
These events sparked significant academic interest in global civil society and its potential to act as a transformative force in global economic governance. In much of the existing literature, global civil society has been heralded as a democratizing force (Anheier 2004; Archibugi and Held 2011) . It has been seen as a source of counter-hegemonic resistance to the current path of neoliberal globalization (Gill 2008) , with the potential to "tame" and "civilize" globalization (Kaldor 2000) or to usher in a new type of "globalization-from-below" (Falk 2014 ).
Loaded with a broad set of ambitions and aspirations, as Ronaldo Munck (2004) observes, global civil society has taken on almost "mythical proportions." In the process, however, our understanding of actually-existing global civil society -as an analytical construct used to understand and interpret the social world -has been hampered by blurring with its normative ideal (Chandler 2007; Kenny and Germain 2005) .
This article contributes to our conception of actually-existing global civil society by examining the case of the WTO, a core institution in global governance. Despite considerable theoretical interest in global civil society, there have been few empirical studies of how it actually engages with and works to influence the WTO. Although there is a large literature on the relationship between the WTO and civil society, it has focused primarily on one pole of this dyad: the WTO, its initiatives directed at civil society and the extent to which it has (or has not) been changed by this interaction (Hannah 2011; Howse 2003; Kapoor 2006; Mortensen 2003; Wilkinson 2005; Williams 2005) . Where the literature has turned to examine the other poleglobal civil society -it has focused on the Seattle protests (Gill 2008; Halliday 2000; Kaldor 2000 ; Levi and Olson 2000; Murphy and Pfaff 2005) , with comparatively little attention to global civil society's engagement with the WTO in the 15 years since then. During this period, an incipient divide within civil society grew increasingly pronounced. Although sharing the broad objective of advancing social justice, civil society actors have differed in their strategies regarding engagement with the WTO. Some organizations made the decision to go "inside" the corridors of power, engage directly with trade officials, and lobby for change within the institution. Others decided to stay "outside," refusing to engage with the WTO, calling for its abolition, and working to construct alternatives to neoliberal globalization through initiatives such as the World Social Forum. Scholte (2004) has characterized this as a split between "reformers" and "rejectionists". Within the politics of social change, the relative merits of, and tensions between, reformist and revolutionary approaches has been a topic of long-standing debate. In the case of the contemporary global justice movement and its mobilization surrounding trade, the rejectionist camp has attracted considerable attention and academic research (Patomäki and Teivainen 2004; Santos 2006; Smith 2004 ). However, we know far less about what has happened to the reformers attempting to effect change within the WTO.
In this article, I focus the lens of analysis on civil society actors seeking to engage with and influence the WTO, examining their activities and interaction with the institution. I argue that the dynamics of transnational advocacy directed at the WTO have changed dramatically since the iconic Seattle protests. In the process of seeking to transform the WTO, many civil society actors have themselves been transformed: they have both become more technocratic and increasingly moved towards advocating positions that accord with the dominant neoliberal trade paradigm. I draw on Bourdieu's field theory to explain why and how this transformation has occurred. I argue that, in order to understand these changes among parts of civil society, we need to see multilateral trade governance as a social field, structured and stratified by power relations and the distribution of capital, which civil society actors enter into as they seek to impact outcomes at the WTO. The case of the WTO challenges existing theories that conceive of global civil society as an exogenous force that acts upon the institutions of global governance, showing instead that global civil society is not in fact separate or autonomous but shaped and influenced by the institution it targets.
Conceptualizing Global Civil Society and Global Governance
Contemporary theorizing on global civil society is rooted in the concept of civil society, used to refer to the sphere of social interaction composed of associations and public communication, seen as a critical component of democratic society. Civil society is most often conceptualized as a distinct social sphere, separate and autonomous from the state (Alexander 2006:53; Taylor 1991; White 1994:379) , or as an independent "third realm" differentiated from both the state and market (Kaldor 1999:200; Lipschutz 2007 ). The concept is closely tied to the Habermasian notion of the public sphere, a site of public debate and deliberation, where public opinion is formed and then channeled to critique and shape governance. Gramscian perspectives conceive of civil society as the sphere where the hegemony of ruling elites is enabled or disabled, such that it may be either "an agent of stabilization and reproduction" of the existing social order or "a potential agent of transformation." (Cox 1999: 4-5) Extended to the global level, the concept of civil society has been used to capture the activity of non-state actors in global politics. Scholars have been centrally concerned with the potential of global civil society to act as a transformative force. It has been viewed as a source of alternative norms, values and discourses, giving voice to marginalized peoples and perspectives, broadening the range of issues and terms of debate, and serving as a key source of contestation in the global polity (Florini 2000; Kaldor 1999) . By generating alternative political discourses and debate, global civil society is seen as playing a central role in fostering deliberative democracy in global economic governance, challenging the workings of institutions like the WTO, IMF and World Bank, making them more responsive to popular concerns, and pushing for greater inclusivity, participation and accountability (Kapoor 2006) . This idealized portrait has been criticized for glossing over issues of representation, accountability, legitimacy and unequal power relations within global civil society itself (Chandhoke 2002; Chandler 2007) . The argument made here differs, however, by challenging the premise that global civil society is a separate, independent sphere that acts upon the state (or at the global level, governance institutions like the WTO) and the market. Instead, consistent with a Habermasian approach that recognizes the serious power deficits of civil society vis-à-vis both the state and market and the resulting colonizing effects of the state and market on civil society, I argue that global civil society is not simply an exogenous force that acts upon the institutions of global governance, but profoundly influenced by the institution(s) it targets.
I apply a theoretical framework informed by Pierre Bourdieu's (1990; field theory.
There is growing interest in applying Bourdieusian theory to international politics and law (see, for example, Adler-Nissen 2012; Berling 2012; Dezalay and Garth 2002; Go 2008; Pouliot 2010) , including in the realm of trade (Conti 2011; Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Evans and Kay 2008; Lang 2011 ). There has also been new interest in applying the concept of field to the study of social movements, in order to improve our understanding of political opportunities -the possibilities and limitations social movements face in seeking to advance their concerns -and how the perceived viability of different strategies affects the choices of social movement actors (Evans and Kay 2008) .
Conceptualizing global governance as a social field in the Bourdieusian sense, I argue, provides a valuable means of capturing the terrain of contestation that surrounds any global governance institution, with various actors, endowed with different power resources, vying for recognition and influence. In contrast to more traditional international relations concepts such as regimes (Krasner 1983; Ruggie 1982) or epistemic communities (Haas 1992) , field theory places relations of power and conflict at the center of analysis, bringing into focus how power is constituted, contested and reproduced, as well as providing important tools to illuminate the complex processes of legitimation involved. Field theory thus offers a useful lens for understanding the strategic practices of global civil society in seeking to influence global economic governance. As Bourdieu stressed, a social actor cannot be understood in isolation, but must be viewed as embedded in a social space or field of social interaction. A field is defined as an arena of struggle centered on a specific stake (Bourdieu 1993: 72) . A field is structured by the state of power relations among the agents within it, with the positions of social actors and their relationships determined by the distribution of capital, or resources (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) . Capital can take a variety of forms, including economic, technical, scientific, political, military, cultural, social, or symbolic (Swartz 1997) .
1 Actors in dominant positions are able to wield power over the field as a whole and shape how different forms of capital are valued in that field (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008) .
Certain insights from field theory -related to the gatekeeping effects of capital, the centrality of recognition, and how these combine to produce specific forms of struggle within a field -are particularly relevant for studying the behavior of civil society in global governance.
Capital is simultaneously a weapon and a stake of struggle, which "allows its possessors to wield a power, an influence, and thus to exist, in the field under consideration, instead of being considered a negligible quantity" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 98) . The capital that an actor possesses and how it is evaluated in that field defines their position in the hierarchy of the field (Berling 2012; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008) . But capital also performs an important gatekeeping function, serving to define and police the boundaries of the field:
An agent may be deprived of the right to speak in the field … if certain types of capital are not possessed or certain ways of playing the game are not followed. … [T]he agent needs to be recognized as a player in a field in order to become one. (Berling 2012: 463) The boundaries of the field -who is recognized as having a legitimate claim to participate, or "right to exist" (Go 2008) , in the field -are themselves an important subject of contestation and struggle (Bourdieu 2004) . Possession of field-specific capital is necessary both for being accepted as a player in the field and optimizing one's position within it.
Field theory highlights the relational nature of power and the centrality of recognition (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 96) . Capital has no intrinsic value of its own but "needs to be recognized as authoritative in a specific field in order to be valuable." (Berling 2012: 455) Symbolic capital is the form "assumed by different kinds of capital when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate." (Bourdieu 1990: 128) Accumulating the specific forms of capital valorized within a field enables an actor to gain symbolic capital (legitimacy, recognition, esteem, authority) (Bourdieu 2000: 166) . The strategies that actors employ are thus "relational to the configuration and content of the field." (Go 2008: 209) Different fields provide distinct opportunities for certain strategies while denying others, depending upon the relative positions of players within it, the strategies of other players, and the modes of action valorized within that field. "Entry into a field requires the tacit acceptance of the rules of the game, meaning that specific forms of struggle are legitimated whereas others are excluded." (Swartz 1997: 125) The field thus imposes specific forms of struggle; otherwise, one risks being ignored or discredited by other agents within the field.
Drawing on field theory, I argue that civil society actors seeking to impact decisionmaking within a global governance institution are forced to negotiate and respond to the opportunities and constraints that arise from the configuration of the field in which that institution is embedded, its power relations, institutional dynamics, and dominant ideology and modes of operating. 
Background: The WTO and the Rise of Civil Society Activism
The creation of the WTO marked the start of the neoliberal turn in the multilateral trading system (Mortensen 2003; Williams 2005) . While the GATT was a comparatively weak organization, with limited power over its membership and primarily concerned with reducing tariffs, the WTO expanded the scope of trade rules into new and more intrusive areas of domestic policymaking and created a dispute settlement mechanism that made its rules binding on states.
Under the GATT, states were allowed considerable room to balance trade liberalization with the pursuit of other social and developmental objectives, whereas the WTO was explicitly designed to reduce those flexibilities. Its purpose is to push forward neoliberal economic restructuring on a global scale -privatization, deregulation, protection of property rights, and the dismantling of The Seattle protests drew unprecedented media and public attention to the WTO. In response to criticisms that it lacked transparency and suffered from a democratic deficit, the WTO made limited moves towards increasing its interaction with global civil society, including:
hosting an annual Public Forum, accepting amicus curiae briefs in dispute settlement proceedings, offering "online chats" with the Director-General, derestricting some documents and increasing information dissemination through its website. Yet, there is no consultative mechanism for civil society and its access to the WTO remains severely constrained. While the UN is comparatively open and responsive, the WTO -and other economic institutions such as the IMF and (to a lesser extent) the World Bank -have been far more restrictive and impervious to concerns raised by global civil society (Smith 2008) .
Global Civil Society in the Field of Multilateral Trade Governance
As the following analysis will show, civil society actors have been forced to struggle simply for the right to exist in the field of multilateral trade governance. Their ability to gain access to the field and be recognized as legitimate actors -and therefore have any chance of wielding influence -has depended upon their ability to mobilize necessary forms of fieldspecific capital. As Bourdieusian field theory underscores, their strategies must be understood in relation to the configuration and content of the field, which impose specific forms of struggle by providing opportunities for certain strategies while denying and excluding others. This section turns to analyzing how the advocacy of civil society actors has been transformed as they have struggled to equip themselves with the forms of capital necessary to become accepted as players For civil society actors, the field of multilateral trade governance is a "hostile field" (Evans and Kay 2008: 987) . The attitudes of trade officials towards civil society actors and the issues they raise are frequently dismissive, as evident in the comments of Secretariat officials:
at the beginning the level of misunderstanding was just about, well, sky-high. It was really almost 100%… there was kind of a visceral reaction against [the WTO]. And we had things like the Seattle schmozzles and so forthdemonstrations of one kind or another, from people who basically believed it was all kinds of monstrous things.
To trade officials, the arguments advanced by many civil society actors and their methods appear ridiculous -the product of a lack of "knowledge" or "understanding" of the WTO -or attributable to something more malicious. A WTO Director-General, for example, in a speech opening the WTO's first Public Forum for civil society, referred to the Seattle protesters as "mindless, undemocratic enemies of the open society" whose "slogans are trite, shallow and superficial."(WTO 2001) Such comments from trade officials demonstrate the "soft repression" (Ferree 2005 ) -the use of ridicule and stigma to delegitimize and silence -to which global civil society has been subject in this field. As one Secretariat official acknowledged, NGOs have historically been "demonized" within the WTO.
boundaries of participation. Without such recognition, civil society's power to influence the internal workings of the WTO was severely circumscribed.
Marshalling Technical Expertise
Civil society actors have faced an uphill battle to be seen as credible and legitimate actors in the field of multilateral trade governance. This is, in their words, a struggle "to be taken seriously." 6 In this field, "seriousness" is viewed as a prerequisite for contributing to debates and deliberations over the appropriate design of multilateral trade rules, and its key marker is technical expertise. The ability to mobilize expertise represents a critical form of capital for civil society actors seeking to access core actors in the field and be seen as legitimate participants and interlocutors; without it, they are not recognized as credible or legitimate and effectively blocked from participation. As one respondent stated, unless they "master the technicalities of the negotiations" and "learn to talk to delegates at their level," civil society actors face "a brick wall." 7 Marshalling technical expertise provides a point of entry -a way to penetrate the "brick wall" -and gain access to the field.
This has driven many NGOs to become increasingly "technocratic" in their advocacy directed at the WTO, expanding their level of technical expertise and capacity, as well as their emphasis on these attributes (Hopewell 2009; Mably 2006 in their debates has changed the nature of their advocacy -from articulating passionate and broad-based critiques of structural inequalities in the global economy and the damaging effects of trade liberalization and neoliberal policies to debating the design of a tariff reduction formula or safeguard mechanism. In addition, the language of trade policy is not neutral but laden with the inherent biases of economic liberalism: government regulation, for example, is a "non-tariff trade barrier" and any effort to limit "free" trade is labeled "protectionism." Adopting such language limits the terms on which civil society actors can engage in contestation. At the WTO Public Forum, for example, the primary official venue for NGOs to interact with trade officials, words such as "neoliberalism" or "transnational corporation" (which would signal an outside paradigm) are virtually absent. 
Allying with Recognized Actors
Civil society actors have also struggled to increase their power in the field by building political capital, or cultivating alliances with other actors in the field -particularly states, who unlike civil society have official standing at the WTO and are seen as rightful actors within the field. Forming alliances with states provides civil society with a greater set of opportunities to engage in the field and enhances their legitimacy and potential impact. Yet the need to cultivate political capital within the field has further increased the pressure on global civil society to conform to its norms and standards of legitimacy by becoming more technocratic and neoliberal in their advocacy.
For NGOs concerned with international development, part of their motivation to form alliances also stems from the desire to support developing countries in WTO negotiations (Hannah 2014; Scott 2014 ). Many developing countries -particularly least developed countries (LDCs) -are severely under-resourced and suffer an acute lack of technical expertise; in other words, they are deficient in a key form of capital necessary to exert influence within this field.
In part due to this lack of technical capacity, the last round of negotiations -the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994 -was highly unbalanced and imposed significant costs on developing countries (Gallagher 2008 Yet this role comes with considerable challenges. At the time of Seattle, developing countries in particular were highly suspicious and mistrustful of NGOs, associating them with the issues of labor and environmental standards that they strongly opposed. As a result, NGOs felt they "had to gain their trust. And to do that we had to show them that we could be helpfulto show how we could support their agenda." 21 Now, expertise provides NGOs with something that they can offer to developing country delegations, but there are set parameters around this:
Delegates know who they want to hear from … they're not advocacy officers or public relations people; they are a lawyer or technical expert who happens to be working for a particular NGO. Delegates are not looking for positions or statements. They're looking for technical or legal inputs.
22
NGOs have increased their access to trade officials by de-emphasizing advocacy and instead emphasizing their specialist research, policy, and technical capacity. They effectively have had to disguise the fact they are doing advocacy: as one stated, "part of the reason we were effective was because delegates didn't feel we had an agenda. 
Shifting to Neoliberal Advocacy Positions
The same pressures that have led many civil society organizations to strive to develop campaign. According to a representative, the organization stopped engaging on a number of issues "because we felt we weren't going to get what we wanted in terms of outcomes and we
wanted to see where we really could have an impact." It came to realize "the benefits of specializing" in seeking to use the WTO to reduce fisheries subsidies, which contribute to overfishing and depletion of fish stocks. 28 The fisheries subsidies issue was "more concrete" and looked like "an easy sell" because it fit neatly within the neoliberal paradigm (which opposes subsidies as a violation of the free market principles of economic efficiency and competitiveness) and could therefore attract support within the WTO:
We saw convergence. Subsidies reform is a core WTO business and it provided something tangible that the WTO could do on the environment. We thought we could provide them with green political cover -a way for the WTO to play a role in sustainable development.
29
The subsidies issue also provided the opportunity for WWF -along with Greenpeace, Friends of their competitors (Japan, China). By the standards of most civil society interaction with the WTO, this strategy was highly effective: fisheries subsidies were designated a special item in the negotiations; the NGOs indicate that they have found "some of our footprint and some of our language" reflected in states' negotiating proposals; and WTO officials frequently point to the issue as evidence of the organization's openness to civil society.
30
Another example is the issue of reducing rich country agricultural subsidies and improving developing country access to these markets. Oxfam, the international development to gain the same kind of legitimacy. The barriers involved in trying to advance such issues have caused many NGOs to move away from them, as one representative explained:
At the beginning, we tried to think about how we could promote an alternative vision for the international trading system and really shift the track it is on. But over time we realized that wasn't in our reach -there's little appetite for significant reform. So we have focused on where change is likely to happen.
34
The respondent indicated that the NGO had initially wanted to advance several issues related to global trade regulation that it considered important, including policies to address market concentration and the power of transnational corporations and commodity agreements to raise incomes for developing country producers:
But we didn't think these issues were going to go anywhere at the WTO. They are totally contrary to the basic philosophy of the WTO, which is to free markets from government intervention... So instead we pursued other issues [like agricultural subsidies] that we thought were more feasible.
Although many NGOs began with aspects of their campaigns that accorded less neatly with a neoliberal framework, these have fallen to the background as the pro-liberalization elements have taken prominence.
While the engagement of WTO negotiators and Secretariat officials with global civil society has increased, it remains highly selective -skewed towards actors and issues that fit within and support their own agendas (Wilkinson 2005) . As one Secretariat official indicated:
They [NGOs] can say things we can't. Like on agriculture subsidies, there's no one in this organization [the Secretariat] that likes them, but we couldn't say that because we can't criticize our members. We couldn't say that in the beginning, but now [because of the work of NGOs on the issue] we can say that in a meeting and no one will oppose you. Everyone pretty much agrees they're bad. Even where NGOs have been seemingly most successful in advancing more heterodox ideas and agendas, they are still highly constrained by the orthodoxy of the field. This is evident, for example, in NGO efforts to help developing countries -represented by the Group of 33 (G33) -secure flexibilities to protect their agriculture sectors in the Doha Round. To promote food security and protect rural livelihoods, the G33 has sought a "special products" (SPs) exemption that would allow developing countries to shield some products from tariff cuts, a "special safeguard mechanism" (SSM) that would allow them to raise tariffs in response to an import surge and, most recently, under India's leadership, changes to WTO subsidy rules to enable developing countries to engage in public food stockholding. Due to strong opposition from the US, these have been among the most contentious issues in the negotiations -the SSM was a central factor in the breakdown of the 2008 Ministerial, while food stockholding nearly prevented agreement on, and subsequently adoption of, the 2013 Bali Package ( Wilkinson, Hannah, and Scott 2014) . With extensive support from NGOs, the G33 has ensured that the SSM and SPs will be part of any final Doha agreement and secured an interim due restraint mechanism making food stockholding immune from WTO challenges ( . Particularly since the G33 lacks its own internal research capacity, high-quality research and technical analysis provided by NGOs -especially ICTSD -has been critical to legitimizing the G33 and boosting its credibility (Mably 2009 ).
Yet, as Eagleton-Pierce (2012) discusses, while these accomplishments are far from trivial, this is a considerable distance from where the initial civil society campaigns that helped to put these issues on the agenda at the WTO began. Many of the key civil society actors involved started from a radical stance critiquing the negative impacts of the liberal trading regime on global food security. Over time, however, the "full heretical force" of their initial critique "has been partially sidelined or lost as the negotiations shifted into conventional bargaining" over market access demands and NGOs became embroiled in highly technical debates about how (relatively narrow) instruments like the SSM and SPs would be designed and operationalized (Eagleton-Pierce 2012: 145) . From condemning the orthodox trade vision, NGO advocacy has instead shifted to struggling "within the confines of WTO categories and rules to reduce potential harmful effects of liberalizing trends for poor farmers."(Eagleton-Pierce 2012:
121) Although measures such as the SSM and SPs deviate from the strict dictates of neoliberalism -by creating some very limited exceptions to liberalization for developing countries -this is far from unusual within the GATT/WTO system, which has always contained various exemptions and safeguards to allow states to protect sensitive sectors (Messerlin and Woolcock 2012) . Such exemptions have been considered integral to the functioning of the system, an "escape clause" or "safety valve" enabling the larger project of liberalization to move forward. Thus, the G33 agenda supported by many NGOs represents, at most, a rather weak critique: while it departs from the neoliberal orthodoxy, it does so only in a very limited wayand one that makes sense to, and fits within, the longstanding workings of the multilateral trading system (Eagleton-Pierce 2012).
Internal Debates and Struggles within Global Civil Society
Of those civil society actors seeking to engage with the WTO, the most successful -in terms of their ability to access the field and be received as legitimate players within it -have increasingly moved towards more technocratic forms of advocacy, closer relationships with policymakers, and campaigns that resonate with the dominant values and orientation of the field.
Civil society actors who have successfully affected this transformation have risen to prominence and been brought closer to the center of power. Such actors are increasingly assuming the role of "insiders" -accepted members of the trade community surrounding the WTO. They have intentionally cultivated the forms of capital valued in this field and demonstrated an ability and willingness to adapt to its norms, gaining greater inclusion and influence as a result. However, not all civil society actors are equally willing or able to make such a shift. As one NGO respondent observed, this is "good for some NGOs and civil society groups and not good for governance is far from universal and has been the subject of considerable contestation and struggle within civil society.
Conclusion
The case of the WTO highlights the opportunities and challenges faced by global civil society in trying to engage with and influence global economic governance. Through this case study, I have argued that global civil society is not an independent or exogenous force in global governance, but shaped and influenced by the institution it targets. Drawing on Bourdieu's field theory, I have shown that many key civil society actors seeking to participate in the field of multilateral trade governance have been drawn towards increasingly technocratic and neoliberal forms of advocacy. Field theory helps us to understand this shift by seeing the strategic practices of these civil society actors as relational to the logic of the field in which they seek to operate.
The changes described here -from protesting in the streets dressed in turtle costumes holding of legitimacy and how they affect civil society may vary. But, the conditions we observe in the field of multilateral trade governance -the privileging of expertise, economistic discourses, and neoliberal ideology -are far from unique to that institution, suggesting that many of the same pressures on global civil society identified here are likely to be at work beyond the WTO.
Global economic governance institutions now routinely trumpet the importance and value of their interactions with civil society. However, this study suggests the need to look critically at these claims and the interactions that underlie them. The case of the WTO demonstrates how the transformative potential of global civil society -its ability to introduce alternative discourses and perspectives into debates and deliberations, broaden participation, and foster global democracycan be inhibited by the global governance institutions themselves and the dynamics of the fields in which they are situated.
